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PEDESTRIANS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES--A REVIEW OF THE WISCONSIN
CASES
ALLAN

E.

MAGEE

W

ITH the almost universal use of the automobile as a means
of transportation, both for pleasure and business, the amount of
litigation involving automobiles has increased tremendously. The most
cursory examination of the Wisconsin reports reveals how much of the
time of our courts, both trial and appellate, is taken up with such litigation. This article is confined to a consideration of a particular phase
of automobile law in Wisconsin-that on injuries to pedestrians, and
attempts to determine the factors that influence the courts' decisions
under particular circumstances.
For about fifteen years after the automobile came into general use
the courts attempted to make satisfactory dispositions of cases under
negligence law that had been developed before the "automobile age,"
remarking that, "* * * excepting statutory regulations this use (of
automobiles) has not changed the well established rules governing the
law of negligence. It has only made it necessary to apply those rules to
new conditions."12 Gradually it became obvious that these "new conditions" made necessary a clear cut determination of the rights and duties
on the part of operators of motor vehicles and other users of the highways. This realization culminated in the legislative enactment of 1929,
now section 85.44 of the Statutes, which became effective on Nov. 5,
1929. The provisions pertinent to pedestrians are set forth below, 3 and
Even in this field it is limited. The numerous cases on injuries to pedestrians
waiting for or alighting from streetcars are not considered, inasmuch as they
are a large field in themselves and involve a particular statute, 85.16 (9), not
considered here.
2 See Blazic v. Franzwa, 179 Wis. 260, 191 N.W. 572 (1923).
3 85.44 (1) PEDESTRIANS RIGHT OF WAY. The operator of any vehicle shall yield
the right of way to a pedestrian crossing the highway within any marked or
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection except at those intersections where the
movement of traffic is being regulated by traffic officers or traffic control signals.
(2) PEDESTRIANS RIGHTS AND DUTiEs AT CONTROLLED INTERSEcIoNS. At
intersections where traffic is controlled by traffic control signals or by traffic
officers, operators of vehicles shall yield the right of way to pedestrians crossing or those who have started to cross the highway on a green or "GO" signal
and in all other cases pedestrian shall yield the right of way to vehicles lawfully proceeding directly ahead on a green or "GO" signal.
(4) PEDESTRIANS RIGHT OF WAY FORFEITED WHEN JAY WALKING. Every
pedestrians crossing a highway at any point other than a marked or unmarked
crosswalk shall yield the right of way to vehicles upon the highway.
(5) PEDESTRIANS ON SIDEWALKS. Pedestrians upon any sidewalk shall have
the right of way over all vehicles crossing such sidewalk.
(6) PEDESTRIANS TO WALK ON LEFT SInE OF HIGHWAY. Pedestrians using
those highways not provided with sidewalks shall travel on and along the left
I
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since they make rather marked departures from the early law, should
be carefully considered in any cases arising after their enactment.
Pedestrian litigation in Wisconsin may be divided into that arising
before the 1929 Statutes and that-arising afterwards. This article further classifies these two groups with respect to the position or location
of the injured pedestrian, for, as will appear, the courts have required
different standard of care for different situations. While some of the
early cases can no longer be followed because of the subsequent statutory changes, they are here considered briefly to illustrate the progress
of the law in this field.
CASES BEFORE 1929
Throughout this period the starting point in the consideration of
every case was the proposition that all persons had equal rights in the
highways. This was first recognized by the legislature in 1905, when
the rule was put into statutory form4 and it still obtains, except as modified by the present statutes.5

ON CITY STREETS

Pedestrianon a regular cross-walk of an uncontrolled intersection.
In one of the very first cases involving an injury to a pedestrian by
an automobile 6 the trial court was reversed for giving an instruction
that "a foot passenger is entitled to the right of way upon a regular
street crossing." The Supreme Court was doubtless without choice in
deciding on the alleged error in the instruction, for at that time sec.
1636-51 was in effect, and, as pointed out by the court on appeal,
"There is no modification giving foot users a right of way over other
users." This trial judge perhaps found ample consolation years later in
1929 when the legislature realized the wisdom of his view, and enacted
the substance of his instructions into the present sec, 85.44 (1).
Rules laid down in some of these early cases still obtain today, and
are frequently referred to by counsel and courts. One of these is the
proposition of Brickell v. Trecker 7 that a pedestrian crossing a busy
side of such highway and the pedestrian, upon meeting a vehicle shall, if
practicable, step off the traveled roadway.
4 "Every owner and operator of an automobile or other similar motor vehicle
shall have equal rights upon all public highways of this state with all other
users of the highway." Sec. 1636-51, 1905 Statutes. However, the rule seems
to have been developed by the courts long before legislative recognition was
given, for in 1890 in Mittlesteadt v. Morrison, 76 Wis. 265, 44 N.W. 1103, the
court says, "The proposition cannot be denied that all persons have an equal
right to travel upon a public highway. From this equal right it follows that
each person must make a reasonable use of the highway so as not to interfere with the enjoyment of the common right."
5 Sec. 85.11, Wis. Stats., 1933.
6 Grimes v. Snell, 174 Wis. 557, 183 N.W. 895 (1921).
7 176 Wis. 557, 186 N.W. 593 (1922).
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city street must look before leaving the curb, and must make another
observation upon reaching the center of the street. Failure to do so was
held to constitute contributory negligence. The case was decided under
the "equal rights" statute, but apparently is still law today.,
Another far-reaching rule, developed in this period, holds the violation of a safety statute to constitute negligence as a matter of law. It
seems to have been first laid down in Drahenburgv. Knight9 when the
defendant, in turning a corner, failed to keep to the right of the intersection as required by 1636-49b (1) of the 1921 Statutes. Proeimate
cause was the one issue submitted to the jury. Later in Brown v. Redmond,10 on similar facts, the statute is not mentioned, but that the rule
of the Drahenburg case still obtains seems clear under later cases.'"
It was held error in Sewart v. Olsen12 to admit in evidence city traffic
ordinances that were in conflict with this statute.
As might be expected in these cases, one of the defendant's principal contentions is that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Before the enactment of the comparatively negligence statute in 193113
a finding of contributory negligence left the plaintiff without remedy.
Usually the question is held to be for the jury, and only in a few cases
did the court find against the plaintiff as a matter of law.' 4 When the
plaintiff is a young child different standards are applied, and children
under five years of age are, in Wisconsin, conclusively presumed to be
incapable of contributory negligence.' 5
8 See Salsich v. Beinn, 205 Wis. 524, 238 N.W. 394, 79 A.L.R. 1069 (1931).

9 178 Wis. 386, 190 N.W. 119 (1922).

10 187 Wis. 67, 203 N.W. 739 (1925).

"1See Edwards v. Kohn, 207 Wis. 381, 241 N.W. 331 (1932).
:12 188 Wis. 487, 206 N.W. 909, 44 A.L.R. 1292 (1925).
3331.045, Wis. Stats. (1933).
'1 See Blaznc v. Frannwa, 179 Wis. 260, 191 N.W. 572 (1923), where the plaintiff
was crossing the street carrying an umbrella. On the authority of the Brichell
case it was held that the plaintiff had as good an opportunity to see that
defendant as he had to see her. The jury's finding of negligence and no contributory negligence were set aside and the complaint dismissed.
In Stewart v. Olson, supra, note (12), plaintiff was running along a sidewalk and saw the defendant's car coming from behind going in the same direction. Plaintiff ran on across an intersecting street, and was struck by defendant's car as the latter turned into that street. Since the plaintiff testified that
he thought the defendant might make the turn, the court held that his continuing to cross was contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In West v. Day, 193 Wis. 187, 212 N.W. 648 (1927), plaintiff, believing she
had time to cross ahead of an approaching car, did so, but was struck. The
court disposed of the defendant's claim of contributory negligence with these
remarks, "If a person may not safely proceed to cross a street when there
are no autos within half a block, without being guilty of contributory negligence, then indeed, the crossing of a busy street become a dubious undertaking.
She (plaintiff) had a right to assume that autos, which she saw, were proceeding with ordinary care, and to act upon the assumption that she could
proceed. There is nothing to the contention that plaintiff was guily of contributory negligence as a matter of law."
Ruka v. Zierer, 195 Wis. 285, 218 N.W. 358 (1928). In this case the jury found
the defendant not negligent when he struck a child who ran out from the
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Pedestrian on a Regular Cross-walk of a Controlled Intersection.
Only two cases in this group came up before the enactment of the
1929 Statutes. In Barntio v. Dowling,6 the plaintiff was crossing with
the traffic and was struck by the defendant who started his car before
being signalled by the officer. It was held error to non-suit the plaintiff,
the court holding, "It was not only incumbent"upon the defendant when
starting his car to observe the action of the traffic officer, but also the
condition of the highway with respect to vehicles and pedestrians."
In Raab v. Brzoskowski' 7 in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff
the court held that, "The change of the light from red to amber does
not justify the traffic in moving across a crossing until a reasonable
opportunity for travelers properly on the street to reach the sidewalk."
In both of these cases it was held that questions of negligence and
contributory negligence must be submitted to the jury. No mention is
made of city traffic ordinances that probably then were in effect.
Pedestriansin the street at a place other than a regular cross-walk.
While the statute giving all users equal rights in the highway was
in effect no distinction was made with regard to the place of the pedestrian's crossing. The questions of his own care and that of the driver
are almost without exception submitted to the jury. However, cases
coming under this classification have developed under rules of law
that are now most important in automobile litigation. One of the outstanding propositions is that set forth in Ludke v. Burck,'8 where the
plaintiff, a child, ran into the street to recover a hat. It was held that a
violation of a statute fixing a speed limit is negligence as a matter of
law, but that it does not deprive the defendant of the defense of contributory negligence except where he has been grossly negligent.
Within a period of eleven years, we find the court rejecting a proposed standard for ordinary care of a pedestrian, and then later adopting it in full. In Klohow v. Harboughlsa the defendant asked that the
plaintiff be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law on the
ground that if he had looked he would have seen the defendant's car
which was in plain sight, that if he did not look, such failure was neg-

sidewalk, but a new trial was ordered for the failure of the trial court to

stress the standard of care required when small children are involved. "To
hold him (defendant) to an anticipation that some of them might suddenly
dart out into the street is not at all unreasonable." Compare Hanes v. Henneson, 205 Wis. 16, 236 N.W. 646 (1931) where the jury's finding of no negligence on the part of a driver, who had hit a small child, was sustained.
16 186 Wis. 422, 202 N.W. 687 (1925).
17204 Wis. 319, 236 N.W. 133 (1931).
is 160 Wis. 440, 152 N.W. 109, L.R.A. 1915D, 968 (1917).
isa 166 Wis. 262, 164 N.W. 999 (1917).
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ligence in itself. The court refused to apply this rule, holding that it
was an attempt to extend the "look and listen" rule, applied to persons
approaching a railroad crossing, to persons crossing a city street. It was
dismissed as "going too far."
Then in 1928, when auto traffic had greatly increased, a case on
similar facts arose.19 The plaintiff with a view of 250 feet testified
he saw no cars approaching, but was struck within twelve feet of the
curb. The court held that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law and incidentally, applied to pedestrians the rule contended for but rejected in the Klokow case. No clearer explanation of the
20
changing viewpoint of the court can be made than to quote it directly.
The case is important because it marks a direct departure from the
position of the court in the Klokow case, and the reason, as recognized
in the opinion, is the greatly increased amount of automobile traffic.
More cases involving injuries to infant pedestrians arose, but in
two of them the court was not required to go into the question of contributory negligence, finding in the facts that the defendant was not
negligent.2' In Schmidt v. Reiss 2 2 it was held that in Wisconsin a child
seven years old may be contributorily negligent, and this question is
for the jury under instruction that the child is not held to the same
degree of care as adults but is held to that standard of care ordinarily
exercised by prudent children of the same age, experience, and intelligence.
19Mertens v. Yellow Cab Co., 195 Wis. 646, 218 N.W. 85 (1928).
0 "This court has held many times that such a situation does not present a jury
question. Under such circumstances a person is presumed not to have looked or
to have heedlessly submitted himself to the danger. He is not permitted to say
that he looked when, if he had looked, he might have seen that which was in
plain sight.
"Courts have said that the look-and-listen rule does not apply with the
same rigor to pedestrians crossing city streets that it does to pedestrians crossing railroad and street car tracks. These views were first expressed in the
early days of automobile traffic when such traffic was not as heavy and when
the operator of an automobile was not in especial public favor. Year after
year, however, we find greater congestion of automobile traffic in city streets
and the danger to pedestrians constantly increasing. Changing conditions have
laid upon him a greater duty with reference to his own safety when he attempts to cross city streets. As a practical proposition, his duty to look for
approaching automobiles is more imperative when attempting to cross a main
city street than when crossing a railroad or street railway track because the
danger is more constant. * * * the far greater frequency with which automobiles pass, as a practical proposition, renders the crossing of city streets scarcely less dangerous than the crossing of a railroad or street car track * * *.At
any rate the time has come when ordinary care requires the pedestian to look
for approaching automobiles before he leaves the zone of safety."
21 See Kammas v. Karras, 179 Wis. 12, 190 N.W. 849 (1922), where the child,
behind and to the left of the driver, and therefore out of his view, ran into
the side of the car, and Sclrmidt v. Heim, 200 Wis. 608, 229 N.W. 33 (1930),
where the plaintiff ran out from behind a parked car which obstructed the
defendant's view.
22 186 Wis. 574, 203 N.W. 362 (1925).
2
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At this time the question of whether the violation of an ordinance
constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law was an open one.
It arose in Fordv. Werth23 where the deceased had crossed the street at
night in the middle of the block in violation of an ordinance, and the
court, remarking on the point, says, "The violations of a city ordinance
regulating automobile traffic and violations of a similar statutory provision have been held negligence, but not necessarily contributory negligence. '

24

Failure to submit the question of contributory negligence

to the jury was held error.
In Rang v. Klawun25 the plaintiff relied on the Ford case to sustain
a jury finding of no contributory negligence. The court refused the
contention and held the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of
law, distinguishing the Ford case on the ground that there the accident
happened at night on a busy street, while here it was daylight and traffic was not heavy, and holding that standards of ordinary care vary
with circumstances and conditions.

ON COUNTRY ROADS

Before the enactment of sec. 85.44 (6) of the 1929 statutes the
cases show instances where pedestrians were walking along either side
of country roads. In determining whether they have exercised ordinary
care for their own safety, courts and juries inquire, among other things,
whether pedestrians have maintained a sufficient observation to the rear.
It is a question of fact to be determined under all the circumstances,
and it has been held that there is no fixed rule of law to determine the
number of such observations required in intervals of either time or
space.

2

Pedestrians vho fail to discover a visible and obvious danger, such
as the approach of an automobile, may properly be found contributorily
negligent.27 In all but the clearest cases, this question of contributory
negligence is for the jury, and it is so held especially when the facts
show that the pedestrian was making a determined effort to escape the
197 Wis. 211, 221 N.W. 729 (1928).
24 Here are cited cases including Maker v. Lochen, 166 Wis. 152, 164 N.W. 847
(1917) where the plaintiff passed to the right of a truck loaded with long
iron beams which extended over the rear, and when the truck turned to the
left, the beams struck plaintiff's car. Statutes 1636-49b prohibited such passing
to the right, but such a violation was held not conclusively to establish contributory negligence since no causal connection between the violation and the
accident appeared. Compare Ludke v. Burck, 160 Wis. 440, 152 N.W. 109,
L.R.A. 1915D 968 (1915).
25 198 Wis. 1, 223 N.W. 121 (1929).
26Davis v. West, 179 Wis. 279, 191 N..W 506 (1923); see also Seitz v. Ott, 174
Wis. 60, 182 N.W. 333 (1921).
27 Vanden Heuvel v. Schultz, 182 Wis. 612, 197 N.W. 186 (1924).
23
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danger. 2 When the plaintiff is found contributorily negligent it is then
immaterial that the defendant was violating a statute fixing the speed
limit in passing school houses. 29 A plaintiff who, carrying an open umbrella in front of him, crosses in front of defendants car when it was
but thirty feet away, is so clearly careless that he must be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 0
The motorist who parks his car on the left side of the road to examine the motor, is entitled to an instruction that such an act is not
contributory negligence. 31 And an occupant of a stalled car, who is
walking on the roadway to keep warm, may, to escape being hit by defendant's approaching car, take refuge in the ditch, and if struck there
is not barred of recovery, for he is in a place where he has a right to
2
be.3
MISCELLANEOUS

The above classifications do not cover a number of noteworthy
cases on injuries to pedestrians. Chief among them are those involving
injuries to workmen on the street, and a quite different standard of
care for their own safety has been established, namely, "That which
an ordinarily careful laborer similarly occupied and situated would exercise under the same or similar circumstances." 33
While this standard does not exact a very high degree of care for
his own safety from the workman, its application necessarily requires a
higher one from the driver. Still it is quite possible to find a set of facts
that allows the plaintiff workman no recovery. Thus in Quinn v. Hartmann,s4 the street laborer was crossing in front of a street car, and was
struck by defendant's car coming along the side of the street car. The
complaint was dismissed, the court holding that this driver had no reason to anticipate that the workman would step from in front of the
street car into defendant's path on a busy downtown street.
Kuebler v. Klug, 191 Wis. 259, 210 N.W. 701 (1926).
Bentson v. Brown, 186 Wis. 629, 203 N.W. 380, 38 A.L.R. 1417 (1925). The
statute involved was 85.08 of the 1925 statutes fixing a speed limit in such districts at twelve miles an hour.
30 Kroehler v. Arntz, 197 Wis. 195, 221 N.W. 727 (1928).
31 Schact v. Quick, 178 Wis. 330, 190 N.W. 87, 25 A.L.R. 130 (1922).
22 Clifton v. Smith, 188 Wis. 560, 206 N.W. 923 (1926).
22
Isgro v. Plankinton Packing Co., 176 Wis 507, 186 N.W. 606 (1922). See also
Trutenwald v. Wis. Lakes Ice and Cartage Co., 121 Wis. 65, 98 N.W. 948
(1904), where the plaintiff, a street cleaner, suddenly swerved from his path
and was run over by defendant's team which was being allowed to take its
own course without the care of the driver. The trial court's directed verdict
for the defendant was set aside, the court saying, "Probably the trial court
did not give proper significance to the circumstances that appellant's duties
required him to move about without any regard to taking any particular course
along the street, and to make frequent trips to the side of the street to empty
his shovel, that his situation was quite different from that of any ordinary
traveler on the street."
4210 Wis. 551, 246 N.W. 587 (1933).
28
29
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Neither do the courts require as high a degree of care from workmen on the streets to others who may get in their way. Where the
plaintiff, a building inspector, stepped into a barricaded street, gazed
at a building, and while so doing was run over by the defendant's
steam roller, the plaintiff was denied recovery, the court holding that
the barricading of the street was a sufficient warning to the public to
keep off, and holding, too, that the plaintiff had no right to expect that
the rollerman, who was backing the steam roller, would keep a constant
lookout.3 5
Pedestrians on sidewalks may feel a greater sense of security than
when crossing streets, but injuries have occurred in such situations.
In Hughes v. Rentschler Floral Co."6 the plaintiff was struck by a car
which had rolled away from its parking place on a hill. A directed verdict for the defendant was held error and a jury trial was ordered to
determine negligence in the manner of parking and setting the brake.
When the pedestrian is struck by an automobile driven over the
sidewalk, it is held that the standard of care for both parties varies
with the circumstances and place of the collision. The courts will take
judicial notice that such a pedestrian may be engaged in thought of
other matters, but if he is duly warned by means of horn or lights, a
verdict may properly be directed for the defendant."

CASES AFTER

1929

ON CITY STREETS

Pedestrian on the cross-walk of an uncontrolled intersection.
After the enactment of sec. 85.44 of the 1929 statutes, effective
Nov. 5, 1929, it might be expected that there would be a considerable
change in the decisions in this type of litigation. This has been true to
a large extent. In few cases have the parties and the court placed no
s 5 Ashton v. P. F. Coughlin Co., 179 Wis. 307, 191 N.W. 561 (1923).
361193 Wis. 49, 213 N.W. 625 (1927).
37 Henderson v. OLeary, 177 Wis. 130, 187 N.W. 994, 24 A.L.R. 942 (1922). Here

the defendant was driving slowly over the walk into his private garage, and it
was found that the plaintiff had due warning when his lights flashed on her
path. An interesting bit of evidence in this case, which arose when automobiles
were comparatively new, was that when the defendant, upon seeing the plaintiff, instead of sounding his horn, yelled, "Whoa, woman!"
Compare this case with Jones v. Nolan, 197 Wis. 311, 222 N.W. 229 (1928)
where the defendant was driving over a walk into a filling station and the
plaintiff walked into the side of his car. Jury findings that the defendant was
not negligent and that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent were sustained. "The degree of care which a pedestrian is required to use while passing over a crossing must be commensurate with the dangers he is liable to
encounter. What might be ordinary care with respect to a private crossing
leading to a dwelling might be insufficient to constitute ordinary care for a
quasi-public crossing leading into a place of business like the one here involved."
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particular emphasis on this statute. The purpose and effect of the new
statutes is well stated in McDonald v. Wichstrand,38 where the jury
found the defendant negligent in not yielding the right of way to the
plaintiff as required by the statute, which finding was affirmed.
A short time later the court had occasion to consider the effect of
the violation of .the safety statutes. It was held that they impose an
absolute duty on drivers to yield the right of way, and that no question
may be submitted to the jury to determine whether the driver was
exercising ordinary care in failing to yield the right of way. It was also
held in this case, "Where negligence is predicated on the violation of
a safety statute, the question of reasonable anticipation or foreseeability does not enter into the question of whether such violation constitutes negligence."3 9
Through volume 212 of the Wisconsin Reports, no cases on injuries
to pedestrians on the crosswalk of a controlled intersection appear.
Pedestrianson the street at a place other than a regularcrosswalk.
As the Edwards case calls attention to the absolute duty of drivers
to obey the safety statutes, Brewster v. Ludtke49 shows that a similar
duty devolves on pedestrians. Upon a showing that plaintiff was crossing the street twenty-five feet north of the crosswalk, and therefore in
a position so that she could not see the car and yield the right of way
as required by statute, she was held contributorily negligent as a matter
of law. In cases under these circumstances, a jury finding of negligence
on the part of the driver cannot be sustained when the plaintiff walks
into his car. No duty can be imposed upon a driver requiring him to
maintain a lookout ahead, diagonally to the right and to the left, and
41
directly to the side as well.
PEDESTRIANS ON COUNTRY RoADs.
The most interesting feature of this group of cases is the court's
somewhat varying treatment of sec. 85.44 (6) requiring pedestrians to
38206 Wis. 58, 238 N.W. 820 (1931). "The difficulties arising from administering
a rule which sought to give the automobile and a pedestrian equal rights at a
crossing resulted in disadvantage and some misfortune to the pedestrian. The
rapid movement and the bulk of the automobile, the thoughtlessness of some
drivers, and the determination of the travelers on foot brought conflicts, if
not collisions, which resulted in the feeling that pedestrians in the nature of
things ought to have a reasonable opportunity when properly on the street at
a cross walk, to reach the sidewalk. This feeling eventually refined into a
public opinion that found expression in the legislation." But it is pointed out
that the pedestrian cannot rely entirely on the fact that he has the right of
3 way.
9Edwards v. Kohn, supra, note 11. Ordinarily the question of proximate cause,
however, must be submitted but here it was held to appear as a matter of law.
Compare with Brewster v. Ludke, infra., note 40.
40 211 Wis. 344, 247 N.W.,449 (1933).
41 Waclismuth v. Wachsmuth, 210 Wis. 683, 247 N.W. 327 (1933).
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walk on the left side of the highway. The proposition was first presented in Leckive v. Ritter42 where the testimony was conflicting as to
whether the plaintiff was walking on the left side of the road. After
holding that the question of contributory negligence was for the jury
the court says, "We have grave doubts as to whether the legislature intended to require a pedestrian walking along a narrow, one track country highway to travel only along the left side thereof with the incidental consequence that a pedestrian not so traveling would be guilty of
a want of ordinary care as a matter of law even though run down by
an automobile approaching from the rear."
At the same time Tillier v. Swette43 came to the court's attention.
The plaintiff was on the left side of the road, but because he was looking back and did not see the defendant's car coming toward him, he
failed to step aside. The appellate court held that the trial judge had
erroneously non-suited the plaintiff, pointing out that under the statute
a pedestrian must step aside only when practicable, and deciding that
the jury would be entitled to believe it had not been practicable for
44
this pedestrian to step aside.

The exact duties of a pedestrian under this statute were not further
clarified until the opinion in Hanson v. Matos45 was handed down.
Here the plaintiff, whose hearing was impaired, was standing in the
middle of a very narrow country road, and not knowing of the defendant's approach, failed to step aside. The jury's finding of contributory
negligence was sustained and the court explains its remarks in the
Leckive case, pointing out that they must be construed with reference
to the circumstances under which they were made, and holding that
narrow country roads are within the provision of the statute, and that
here the plaintiff was bound to comply with it for compliance was neither impossible nor dangerous. 46 Therefore it seems that it is only where
the road is so narrow that a car could not pass a pedestrian without
striking him, whether he was to the right or to the left of the center,

42207 Wis. 333, 241 N.W. 339 (1932).
43207 Wis. 373, 241 N.W. 341 (1932).
44 See also Feller v. Leonard, 207 Wis. 43, 239 N.W. 498 (1932). To the same
effect, where the court further held that a violation of sec. 85.40 (5) requiring
that when traversing a curve where the driver does not have a clear view,
his speed shall be such that he can stop within one half the range of his
vision, might properly give rise to a jury's inference of negligence.
45212 Wis. 275, 249 N.W. 505 (1933).
46 For a more elaborate explanation of the remarks in the Leckive case, see
Weise v. Polzer, 212 Wis. 337, 343, 248 N.W. 113 (1933) in which case the rule
that a safety statute fixes a standard of ordinary care is affirmed. In the Hanson case, the jury's finding of contributory negligence was held proper on another ground also-plaintiff's violation of sec. 85.44 (9), 1931 statutes, forbidding a person "to stand or loiter on any roadway other than in a safety zone
if such act interferes with the lawful movement of traffic."
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that his failure to walk on the left could not be held to be contributory
47
negligence. In other cases he must comply with the statute.
In other cases in this group it is shown that a pedestrian who
crosses a country highway is not contributorily negligent as a matter
of law in failing to look again upon reaching the center of the road.
Brichell v. Trecher, is distinguished on the ground that it applies only
to busy city streets and not to country highways where the traffic is not
heavy. Thus the duties of the pedestrian in the latter situation are
lightened. 4
SUMMARY

Reviewing the results of the foregoing decisions it would seem that
if there is any noticeable tendency in the law in this field, it is to enlarge the rights of pedestrians and the duties of motorists. This is particularly true when it is considered that the comparative negligence
statute, 331.045, 1931 statutes, must now be applied in all these cases.
The chief enlargement of the duties of pedestrians is the adoption of
the rule expressed in Mertens v. Yellow Cab Co. 49 to the effect that a

pedestrian will not be allowed to say he has looked, whereas if he had
looked, he must have seen that which was in plain sight. Certainly sec.
85.44 of the 1929 statutes has determined and clarified the correlative
rights and duties in much more well-defined terms than previously
existed, and should be a marked aid to the courts, attorneys, and juries.
Since a violation of a safety statute is now held negligence as a matter
of law, it is now necessary to submit to the jury only the question of
causation in such instances. The court in Ford v. Werth50 pointed out
that the violation of a safety statute had never then been held contributory negligence as a matter of law. Upon examination of later cases,
the practitioner would find it difficult to see why this should not follow
47 But even this may be subject to some qualification under peculiar facts. In
Bump v. Voights, 212 Wis. 256, 249 N.W. 508 (1933), the plaintiff was running
down the road to recover a lost cap and ran just a bit to the left of the
center of the road, and was hit by the defendant's car coming from the rear.
Refusing to accept the defendant's contention that this plaintiff should have
been held contributorily negligent as a matter of law the court says of sec.
85.44 (6), "It is true that the deceased was not at the extreme left of the
highway * * * but the purpose of this statute is to make a practical use of
the watchfulness of both pedestrians and drivers approaching each other with
the hope of reducing a likelihod of accident. We do not consider that this was
intended in any way to interfere with one's rights to recover property which
accidently gets on the highway. Under such circumstances the conduct of the
actors must be regulated by the rules of ordinary care. The difference between a traveler moving steadily in a given direction toward the oncoming
car and one who seeks to retrieve a lost article, who to do so must invade
the other portion of the highway is obvious."
48 Salsick v. Bunn, 205 Wis. 524, 238 N.W. 394, 79 A.L.R. 1069 (1931).
49
50 Supra, note 19.
Supra, note 23.
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as the converse of the rule of Edwards v. Kohn.5 In any of the cases
relied on in the Ford case, the court's only apparent reason for not
holding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law was
that no causal connection appeared, and in other cases this might be
found by a jury. Apparently such reasoning has now been adopted by
the courts and the case of Brewster v. Ludke52 may be taken as establishing the rule that the violation of a safety statute now constitutes
contributory negligence as well as negligence as a matter of law. When
no safety statute is involved, the question of negligence should go to
the jury in all but the clearest cases. The other important features of
the law shown by the cases are that pedestrians may assume automobiles to be approaching at a lawful rate of speed. They may lawfully
seek safety at the side of the highway. They are to step off the highway
when practicable. A driver's failure to blow his horn is a circumstance
to be considered by the jury in determining whether he exercised ordinary care. Juries must be properly instructed as to the standard of
care required of children or workmen on the street, which standards
are not as high as those for adults and ordinary pedestrians. Different
standards of care for both parties are applied when the defendant's car
crosses a sidewalk. Different standards apply on country roads as distinguished from busy city streets. As yet no case has been found where
both driver and pedestrian are at a controlled intersection, proceeding
with the signal lights or officer's direction in their favor, and an accident occurs when the driver makes a right turn across the pedestrian's
path. It would seem that the question of negligence and contributory
negligence should go to the jury, although it might well be held that
the driver is under a duty to yield the right of way to the pedestrian
on the regular crosswalk, and only the question of proximate cause
should be submitted.
This is particularly a "factual" field of the law, and if a study of
the reported cases fails in a particular situation to establish the rights
and duties of the parties as a matter of law, the cases may be helpful
in anticipating how a jury may decide on similar facts.

-5
52 Supra, note 11.
Supra, note 40.

